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IN THE. SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF BINGHA1f CANYON and 
BOYD NERDEN 
' 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
ICENNECOTT COPPER CORPORA-
TION, a corporation and BO·Y-LES 
BROTHERS DRILLING COl\f-
p ANY, a corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs and respondents in this action are the City 
of Bingham Canyon, a municipal corporation, and Boyd 
Nerden, its building inspector \vho has the responsibility 
of enforcing the zoning ordinance vvhich is the subject 
of the litigation belovv. The defendants and appellants 
are l{ennecott Copper Corporation, \\'"hich operates a 
large open-pit copper rnine extending into the City of 
Bingham Canyon, and Boyles Brothers Drilling Con1pany, 
which is retained by Kennecott to perform exploratory 
core drilling work. 
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On ~fay 5, 1959, the City of Bingham ·Canyon adopted 
the first zoning ordinance in its history. (R.15) That 
ordinance purports to divide the City of Bingham into 
four areas designated for residential, commercial, in-
dustrial and mining uses. (R. 15, Ex. 1) Kennecott 
appeared at the zoning hearing and objected to the adop-
tion of the proposed ordinance because it would restrict 
then existing operations of its open-pit copper mine, 
because the paper zoning lines were arbitrary and bore 
no relationship to the historical uses of the property 
involved, and the Qrdinance by its terms would deprive 
Kennecott of rights guaranteed by the 14th Amendment 
of the Constitution of the United States and by Sections 
7 and 22 of Article I and Article XI of the Constitution 
of the State of lJtah. (R. 7, 28, 45) 
Kennecott was particularly concerned about the ap-
plication of the zoning ordinance to property owned by 
it up-stream from Carr Fork Canyon Junction "1'here all 
of the property was zoned either "Industrial" or "Min-
ing". The ·Company in the past had been performing 
both drilling and mining operations upon its own property 
in the area 'vhich is now eovered by paper zoning lines 
designated I-1, or "Industrial''. 
Such drilling, mining and allied activities constituted 
the sole and exclusive use of sueh property. None of the 
activities prescribed by the zoning ordinance for an in-
dustrial zone (e.g.~ tin s1nelting, ore processing, ore 
wholesaling) were being carried on by Kennecott on such 
property. (R. 33-35, 45-49) 
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The zoning ordinance as drafted and then approved 
over objection of l(ennecott would, if valid, stop a 
substantial portion of the then existing mining opera-
tions on l(ennecott's own property, and would prevent 
the removal of several millions of tons of ore which, at 
that time, had been blocked out in preparation for re-
moval. It also would prevent any future development 
of the mine in this area. (R. 45, 49) 
l(ennecott at no time recognized the lawfulness of 
the purported ordinance but continued its mining oper-
ations in the industrial zone. Prior to the adoption 
by Bingham Canyon of the ordinance here in question, 
ICennecott, through Boyles Brothers Drilling Company, 
had con1pleted two exploratory holes (Ko. 174 and No. 
179) 'vi thin what now is designated as the Industrial 
Zone. (R. 46) In early 1960, l(ennecott, again through 
Boyles Brothers Drilling Company, commenced the drill-
ing of a si1nilar hole in the Industrial Zone above Carr 
Fork Junction and approximately 350 feet from any 
property o'vned by any person other than l(ennecott. 
(R.45-46) That drill hole 'vas designated X o. 51, and 
it 'vas being drilled as part of a systematic plan of ex-
ploration and development. Such exploration and devel-
opment is a necessary part of the mining process. (R. 
23) The drilling of II ole No. 51 did not involve any 
combustion, dust, explosions, fumes or oders. ( R. 27-
28) It did not adversely affect the public health, the 
'vater, air or sewage supplies, the morals, the safety 
or the public 'velfare of any resident of Bingham Canyon 
or of any other person. (R. 46) Indeed, the economy 
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of Bingham Canyon is dependent wholly upon Ken-
necott's mining operation. It 'vould become a ghost town 
if such mining were to cease. ( R. 25-27) 
Shortly after the commencement of the drilling of 
Hole No. 51, the plaintiffs filed their complaint in the 
court below, alleging that the city had adopted the zon-
ing ordinance herein discussed and that the two defend-
ants were violating this ordinance. They prayed for 
interlocutory and permanent injunctions restraining the 
alleged violation of such zoning regulations by either of 
the defendants. (R. 1-3) 
Defendants' answer stated, among other things, that 
the actions complained of were non-conforming uses and 
as such were not prohibited by the zoning ordinance; 
and further, that the zoning ordinance, in its application 
to Kennecott, was unconstitutional. (R. 5-9) 
Following a hearing on order to sho'v cause 'vhy a 
temporary injunction should not issue, the court belo"' 
filed and entered the order from "yhich this appeal is 
taken. This order states in part material here: 
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
defendants be restrained from and enjoined from 
drilling within the city limits of the ·City of 
Bingha1n Canyon during the pendency of this 
action.'' ( R.57) 
At the hearing, plaintiff Boyd Nerden testified for 
plaintiffs and Alvin J. Thuli, Jr., Chief Engineer for 
l{ennecott, testified for the defendants. (R. 10-56) 
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Their testimony (the only evidence adduced) did not 
disclose that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable 
injury pending the hearing of this controversy on its 
Inerits. There 'vas no evidence that drilling of the ex-
ploratory hole involved or the existing mining operations 
of the defendant "rould in any way injure the plaintiffs 
during the pendency of the action. Indeed, the evidence 
of both 'vitnesses was to the contrary. (R. 23-28, 46) 
Further, the court's order, although purporting to 
grant an interlocutory injunction, was not supported 
by findings of fact and conclusions of law as required 
by Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Finally, the court's order was a great deal broader 
than the relief prayed for by plaintiffs in their com-
plaint. The order itself purports to enjoin all "drilling'' 
within the city limits of Bingham Canyon during the 
pendency of this action. As is demonstrated by Exhibit 
1, a good deal of the area involved is zoned ~1-I, or "1\fin-
ing". The ordinance, even if valid, permits the very 
activity which the court here enjoins 'vithin the mining 
zone of Bingham Canyon. The Plaintiffs complain only 
of mining and drilling activities in the industrial zone. 
(R. 1-3) 
On July 29, 1960, this court granted the petition of 
defendants for an intermediate appeal, and modified the 
order of the court belo'v to permit the continuation of 
drill II ole No. 51 during its pendency. (R. 59-60) 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. The interlocutory .injunction issued by the 
trial court is void for the reason that it is supported 
by neither fin~dings of fact nor conclus:ons of law. 
II. The interlocutory injunct:on issued by the 
trial court is void for the reason that it is not sup-
ported by evidence. 
III. The interlocutory injunction issued by the 
trial court is void for the reason that it is b.roader in 
scope than the prayer of plaintiffs' complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
POINT 
The interlocutory injunction issued by the trial 
court is void for the reason that it is supported by 
neither fin.dings of fact nor conclusions of law. 
The interlocutory injunction, from 'vhich this inter-
mediate appeal has been perfected, ,,~as issued by the 
trial court in the absence of any findings of fact or con-
clusions of la"r· It, therefore, does not meet the require-
ments of Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure which reads in part: 
"In all actions tried upon the facts without 
a jury or ""ith an advi~ory j~ry, the court shall, 
unless the same are "~a1ve~, find the facts speci-
ally and state separately Its conclusions of law 
thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate 
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judgu1ent; and in granting or refusi'ng interlocu-
tory injunctions the court shall sirnilarly set forth 
the f'indings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action." (Emphasis 
added) 
vVithout the requisite findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, the court's interlocutory injunction is a 
nullity. In Fisher v Emerson, 15 Utah 517, 50 Pac. 619, 
a case involving an injunction, this court said at page 
521: 
"The making and filing of findings and con-
clusions was part of, and must precede the entry 
of, the judgn1ent." 
'11he effect of the failure of a trial judge to support 
his judgment with findings of fact and conclusions of 
la'v "ras determined by this court in one of its very early 
decisions, ( 1883). In Reich v. The Rebellion S.~f. ·Co., 
et al, 3 Utah 254, 2 Pac. 703 "the issues were tried by 
the court, and without making or filing any findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, judgment was rendered for 
defendant * * *". In reversing that judgment for the 
reason that a judgment cannot stand unless supported by 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in the State of 
Utah, the court said at page 258: 
"Under the 180th Section of the Practice Act, 
in trials of issues of fact by the court, \Yri tten 
findings of fact and conclusions of la\v, separately 
stated, Inust be n1ade and filed before any judg-
Inent can be entered. They are the foundations 
for the judg1nent, and are as necessary to precede 
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any judgment as a verdict in a case of trial .by 
jury. Under our statute, there is no presumption 
in the absence of findings when issues o~ fact are 
tried by the court without a jury. The JUdgme.nt 
of the lower court is reversed and a new trial 
ordered." 
This court has also made clear the fact that this 
requirement applies with equal force to actions at law 
and to cases in equity. This court stated in In Re 
Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 17, 35, 219 Pac. 103; 
"Our statute requires the facts found and the 
conclusions of law to be separately stated. Unless 
that is done and all the material facts found as 
disclosed by the evidence which in the judgment 
of the court and counsel have a bearing upon the 
question as to what the judgment should be, 
nothing more is accomplished than a mere general 
verdict and the wholesome purpose of the statute 
frustrated requiring findings and conclusions to 
be separately found and stated. Such require-
ment of the statute is just as essential in equity 
as in a law case. A judgment rendered on no 
findings or not upon suffi·cient or proper findings 
to support it, has no more validity £n equity than 
in law." (Emphasis added) 
The rule initially pro1nulgated by the Legislature, 
later applied by the courts, and no'Y incorporated by this 
court into its Rule 52 (a) 'vas conceived in wisdon1 and 
is extremely useful to the trial court, to the parties and 
to the Supre1ne Court jn cases "There factual matters are 
determined by the court 'Yithout jury. Being required 
expressly to find the facts upon which its conclusion 
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'"ill rest, and to separately state its legal conclusions 
upon which it predicates its judgment, the trial court is 
less apt to err and is forced to give more than summary 
consideration to evidence and to precedent. The findings 
and conclusions serve as guide posts to the parties thenl-
selves which aid them in determining the legal effect and 
consequences of a judgment and in charting the future 
course of their affairs. They likewise are of vital impor-
tance to a reviewing court to aid and assist it in de-
termining whether the judgment below 'vas properly 
entered. 
Professor 1foore defines the purpose of the substan-
tially identical federal rule as follows: (Moore's Federal 
Practice, Vol. 5 Page 2632) 
"The purpose of findings of fact and con-
clusions of law is to aid the trial court in making 
a correct factual decision and a reasoned appli-
cation of the law to the facts; to define for pur-
pose of res judicata and estoppel by judgment 
the issues then adjudicated; and to aid the ap-
pellate court." 
Federal Courts applying Rule 52 (a) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (which is identical 'vith respect 
to interlocutory injunctions to the Utah Rule) have given 
to findings of fact and conclusions of law the same 
i1nportance and consequences as has this court. One of 
the land-mark federal cases in this area is ~iayo v. Lake-
land Highlands Canning Co. (1940) 309 l-;-. S. 310, 316, 
60 S. Ct. 517, 84 L. Ed 77 -l:. That case involved a suit 
by citrus fruit dealers to enjoin the State Co1n1nissioner 
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of Agriculture from cancelling plaintiff's licenses, from 
enforcing certain minimum price regulations against the 
plaintiffs and from interferring with the conduct of 
plaintiffs' businesses. There, the trial court issued a 
temporary restraining order. This was followed, after 
hearing, by an interlocutory injunction pending the final 
disposition of the case on its merits. (See 28 F. Supp. 
44) In reversing the trial court and setting aside its 
interlocutory injunction, the Supreme Court of the 
United States said: 
"We think the court committed serious error 
in thus dealing with the case upon motion for 
temporary injunction. The question 'Yas not 
whether the commission. had complied with the 
requirements of the act, if valid, but "~as "'"hether 
the showing made raised serious questions, under 
the Federal Constitution and the State law, and 
disclosed that the enforcement of the act, pending 
final hearing, would infl£ct irreparable damages 
upon the complainants. 
"The observations made in the course of the 
opinion are not, in .any proper sense, findings of 
fact upon these vital issues. Statements of fact 
are mingled 'vith argun1ents and interferences 
for which 've find no sufficient basis either in the 
affidavits or the oral testimony. It is of the htgh-
est importance to a proper revieu~ of the action 
of a court in granting or refusing a prelimt1wry 
injuncti'on that there should be fair conzpliance 
with Rule 52 (a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
'' * * * 
''We reverse the decree and remand the cause 
to the court below "~ith instructions that if the 
motion for interlocutory injunction is ~ressed 
the parties if they desire it, 1nay be afforded ~ 
10 
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further hearing, and any action taken by the court 
shall be upon findings of fact and conclusions 
founded upon the evidence, in accordance with 
Rule 52 (a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure." 
(Emphasis added) 
Thus it is submitted that the interlocutory injunc-
tion here in question, unsupported by findings of fact 
and conclusions of law is void. One can only guess what 
facts, if any, were relied upon by the trial court. One 
can only guess concerning the legal reasons, if any, upon 
which he eourt's judgn1ent 'vas predicted. It is, there-
fore, impossible for counsel or for this court to determine 
\vhether the facts, if any, in the mind of the trial judge 
were properly found from the evidence, or vvhether the 
conclusions of law, if any, 'vhich were applied thereto 
\vere proper or appropriate. 
II. 
POINT 
The interlocutory injunction issued by th·e trial 
court is void for the reason that it is not suppo·rted by 
evidence. 
This court but infrequently has had before it ques-
tions relating to the function and prerequisites of the 
interlocutory injunction. However, in the very early case 
of Flagstaff Silver-1\Iin. Co. v. Patrick, 2 Utah 30-±, the 
court cited vvith confidence and approval Section 4, 
, ... ol. 1 of A Treatise on the La'v of Injunctions by James 
L. High of the Chicago Bar 'vith respect to both the 
11 
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nature of and prerequisites for an interlocutory injunc-
tion. In Section 4 of that work l\Ir. High, after first 
stating that the sole purpose of a preliminary injunction 
is to preserve the status quo until the basic issue ul~ 
timately can be determined on the merits, states: 
''And where the granting of an interlocutory 
injuncti:on involves the decision of a novel ques-
tion of latv of grave importance and serious dif-
f~culty the injunction should be denied." (Em-
phasis added) 
Mr. High elucidates further on this subject in Sec-
tion 8 at pages 12 and 13 as follows : 
"The writ of injunction, being largely a pre-
ventative remedy, "rill not ordinarily be granted 
where the parties are in dispute concerning their 
legal right8, until the right is established at la-\v. 
And if the right for "\Yhich protection is sought is 
dependent upon disputed questions of la'v which 
have never been settled by the courts of the state, 
and concerning "Thich there is an actual and exist-
ing dispute, equity "Till 'vithhold relief until the 
questions of la'v have been detern1ined by the 
proper courts.'' 
Hence, the language of nir. High cited "~th approval 
by this court clearl~T de1nonstrates that the interlocutory 
injunction here involYed "Tns in1properly issued by the 
trial court. Here, the underlying and controlling issue 
of law is whether the zoning ordinance in question sought 
to be enforced by the plaintiffs violates the rights of 
the defendants as defined nnd preserved by the 14th 
A1nenchnent to the Con~6tution of the United States and 
12 
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by Sections 7 and 22, Article I and Article XI of the Con-
stitution of the State of L-:-tah. This is certainly a vital 
and important question of law \vhich has not been settled 
by the courts of this state and which is in actual and 
existing dispute between the parties. Consequently, an 
interlocutory injunction should not issue until that con-
trolling question of law, as well as the second question of 
non-conforming use have been decided after hearing on 
the merits. 
Further, as is stated both by l\fr. High in his treatise 
and Ly this court in Flagstaff Silver-1\'fin. Co. v. Patrick, 
supra, the sole purpose of a preliminary injunction is to 
preserve the status quo. Here, the injunction entered by 
the trial court does not preserve the status quo. Instead, 
it unbalances the status quo in favor of the plaintiffs. 
lt orders the defendants to cease vital drilling and min-
ing activities in which they were engaged prior to the 
adoption of the zoning ordinance. Indeed, as is shown 
in argument under Point III, infra, the order is much 
broader than plaintiffs' prayer--the order even pro-
hibits mining in the mining zone! On the other hand, the 
plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence which would 
indicate damage of any kind which they would sustain if 
their application for interlocutory injunction were 
denied. 
This court has ruled that it is important to con-
sider the relative inconvenience to the parties involved 
prior to the granting of an injunction. The equities 
should be balanced. In \\Tinters v. Turner, 74 Utah 222, 
13 
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78 Pac. 816, Cert. Den. 281 U. S. 692, 7 4 L.Ed. 1121, 
50 S.C. 238, reversing a decree enjoining the defendant 
from permitting his cattle to respass upon plaintiff's 
land, this court said at pages 237 and 238 of the Utah 
Report: 
"The comparative convenience or inconven-
ience of the parties from granting or ,vithholding 
an injunction sought should be considered, and 
none should be granted if it 'vould operate op-
pressively or inequitably or contrary to the real 
justice of the case." 
Plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence upon \vhich 
a preliminary injunction could be based, for the testi-
mony of ~ir. Nerden for the plaintiffs and ~fr. Thuli for 
the defendant discloses: 
a. The effect on Kennecott of the paper zoning lines 
and zoning use restrictions \Vas \Yholly \Yithout any· rela-
tionship to the public health, morals or the general 'v-el-
fare of the City of Bingha1n Canyon and of its in-
habitants. 
b. Neither the use restrictions nor the zoning bound-
aries had any relationship ''Thatsoever to the use to which 
the property-all o"\vned by l{ennecott-"\vas being put 
on May 5, 1959. 
c. Enforce1nent of the ordinance could and ,, ... ould 
confer no benefits on other residents or on the 0 ,vners 
of surface land rights or structures "Tithin the city lilnits ~ 
14 
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but the curtailment of the defendant's mining program 
would adversely affect Bingham's residents, businesses 
and the owners of surface rights. 
d. Enforcement of the zoning limitations would pre-
vent Kennecott from removing millions of tons of ore 
blocked out and scheduled for ultimate removal. 
It is respectfully submitted that on the basis of such 
evidence, a preliminary injunction cannot properly issue. 
The United States Supreme ·Court in Mayo v. Lakeland 
I-Iighlands Canning ·Co., Supra, states that the test 
governing the issuance of a preliminary injunction is 
whether the act complained of "pending final hearing, 
would inflict irreparable damages upon the complain-
ants''. (Emphasis added) 
High's Treatise on the Law of Injunctions, 4th 
Edition, Vol. 1, Section 10, reads in part: 
"Interlocutory injunctions being often sought 
for the purpose of harassing and annoying de-
fendants, the utmost care should be observed in 
the exercise of the jurisdiction, and the relief 
should only be allowed upon a clear necessity 
being shown of affording inzmediate protection 
to some right or interest of the party comp!ain-
ing which would other'lvise be seriously injured 
or ~mpared and 'vhere the plaintiff will suffer no 
immediate injury from the acts complained of an(l 
the injury, if any, is of such a nature that it can 
be easily remedied upon final hearing, a prelim-
inary injunction is properly denied." (Emphasis 
added) 
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l\1:r. High continues in Section 22 as follows: 
"An interlocutory injunction 'viii not be al-
lowed where the right ,vhich plaintiff seeks to 
have protected is in doubt or where the tt·nJ.tttry 
U'hich U'ill resuJt fro?n the invasion of the rttght 
is not irreparable." (Emphasis added) 
Mr. Pomeroy in his Equity Jurisprudence, Fourth 
Edition, Vol. 4, Section 1685 (Equitable Remedies, Sec-
tion Edition, Section 264) states as follows in a similar 
ve1n: 
"Preliminary or interlocutory injunctions are 
granted to preserve the property in status quo 
pending the determination of the suit. The right 
to such relief depends upon a showing of irre-
parable injury, and rests 'vithin the sound dis-
cretion of the court.'' (Emphasis added) 
See 28 Am. Jur. 502, Section 14 for a similar state-
ment of the prerequisites for issuance of a preliminary 
or interlocutory injunction. 
Village of Lloyd Harbor v. Huntington, 143 N.Y. 
Supp. 2d 797 (1955) is a case on all fours 'vith the case 
at bar. There, t"'-ro incorporated villages sought to re-
strain a to,vn from building a public beach on property 
purchased by it for that purpose "~ithin such villages 
in areas zoned by the villages for residential use only. 
The villages clai1ned that a state statute authorizing the 
towns to acquire lands and establish public breaches 
within. the jurisdiction of villages "~as unconstitutional. 
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The town in defense maintained that the application of 
the zoning regulations of the villages was unconsti tu-
tional as applied to the acts in question of the town. 
The villages contended that ''The establishment of 
such beaches would completely change the character of 
the neighborhood which is peculiarly suitable for single 
family residences such as have already been constructed 
in that area with resultant congestion in traffic, requir-
ing an increase in police supervision and would material-
ly decrease the market value and consequently the 
taxable value of adjacent property and be a blight on 
the villages." 
The court there viewed the device of the interlocu-
tory injunction in its proper light and refused to issue 
the same prior to the hearing of the matter on the merits. 
In so doing, it stated in part: 
"It is evident, from the nature of the action, 
that the relief that the plaintiffs seek by way of 
a temporary injunction is the same 'vhich may 
be ultimately obtained after trial. Such motions 
are granted with great caution and only when 
necessity requires. (Citing cases). The court is of 
the opinion that the necessity for the drastic re-
lief herein sought has not been demonstrated 
factually. In any event, the balance of conven-
ience is with the defendant 'vhieh is attempt1ng 
to provide a recreational project for the public. 
''Should it be ultimately determined that it 
is unconstitutional for the town to provide these 
beaches, it is difficult to see 'vhat real harn1 could 
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be done to the villages and their inhabitants who 
are the inhabitants of the to,vn of Huntington. 
Indeed the filling in of swampy sections and t~1e 
leveling of others to provide these beaches WI_ll 
be of general benefit even if their use as public 
beaches n1ay ultimately be prohibited. -
"The court is of the opinion that the plain-
tiffs have not made the necessary showing that 
immediate establishment of the beaches will be 
destructive of their rights or cause actual mater-
ial and irreparable injury as distinguished from 
fanciful, theoretical or merely possible injury. 
(Citing cases)" 
Likewise, in our present case, the remedy sought 
and obtained by plaintiffs below by way of temporary 
injunction is the same which they hope ultimately to 
obtain after trial. Here also, the plaintiffs have failed 
to demonstrate any factual basis to justify the "drastic 
relief" granted by the court belo,v. Here, too, the bal-
ance of convenience is 'vith the defendants. They were 
here attempting to continue to n1ine valuable ore de-
posits and, through the con1pletion of drill Hole X o. 51, 
to obtain data and inforn1ation "rhich "~ould be beneficial 
to the City of Binghan1, and effectuate the declared 
public policy of the State of Utah to encourage, not 
prevent, mining. Highland Boy !fining Company v. 
Strickley, 28 lT. 215, 78 Pac. 296. 
Plaintiffs failed to produce a scintilla of evidence 
indicating that the acts of defendants 'vhich ,vere en-
joined below would in any 'vay prejudice, or injure 
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the plaintiffs at all, let alone irreparably. Any possible 
injury to the City involved in such acts by defendants 
'vas indeed "fanciful, theoretical or merely possible." 
There was no showing of any ''material and irreparable 
injury." Consequently, the interlocutory injunction was 
improperly issued. 
III. 
POINT 
The interlocutory injunction issued by the trial 
court is void for the reaso.n that it is broader in scope 
than the prayer of plaintiffs' complaint. 
The plaintiffs in their complaint, (R. 1-3) complain 
only that defendants have engaged in drilling and min-
ing within areas in the City of Bingham Canyon zoned 
for industrial use. There is nothing in the complaint 
charging or in the evidence indicating that the defend-
ants are not entitled to drill and mine 'vithin the city 
limits in those areas specifically zoned for mining pur-
poses. 
However, despite the total absence of such claims or 
evidence, the trial court ordered in broad and 3Weeping 
terms that "the defendant be restricted and enjoined 
fran~ drilling within the city lin~its of the City of Bing-
han~ Canyon during the pendency of this action.'' Thus 
the court ordered defendants not to 1nine in areas spe-
cifically set aside for that purpose by the plaintiffs! 
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CONCLUSION 
It seems thus clear that the order of the trial court 
filed on July 19, 1960 (R. 57) stands wholly \vithout 
support. It is not based upon the necessary findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. It is not supported by the 
necessary evidence. It is not supported by legal or 
equitable precedent. It is not supported by reason. In-
deed, it is not even supported by the claims of the 
plaintiffs themselves. 
The order as wholly arbitrary and capricious should 
therefore be vacated. 
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